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RELIGION, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM,
AND THE RULE OF LAW
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION*
Mark C. Modak-Truran**
The articles and essays in this Symposium were presented for a Section
on Law and Religion panel entitled Religion, Religious Pluralism, and the
Rule of Law at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools ("AALS").1 Part of the panel description helps illuminate the
focus of the articles and papers included in this Symposium:
Popular debate about the relationship between law and re-
ligion appears to be dominated by two camps - religionists
and secularists. Religionists maintain that law ultimately re-
quires a religious foundation which some countries have ex-
plicitly embraced in their constitutions and substantive legal
norms. In the United States, they urge that government of-
ficials recognize this religious foundation by posting the Ten
Commandments, displaying creches, keeping "under God"
in the pledge of allegiance, citing scripture in judicial opin-
ions, and allowing prayer and the teaching of intelligent de-
sign in public schools. Conversely, secularists embrace the
opposite claim that law should have a non-religious founda-
tion. Religion is usually perceived as a threat rather than a
source of social solidarity. In France, for example, the doc-
trine of laicit requires secular solidarity to take priority
over religious freedom by prohibiting children from wearing
* © 2007 by Mark C. Modak-Truran. All rights reserved.
** J. Will Young Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Gustavus
Adolphus College; J.D., Northwestern University; A.M., Ph.D., The University of Chicago.
1. The Program Committee of the Section on Law and Religion for the 2007 Annual Meeting of
the AALS formulated the program description and selected the outstanding speakers for the panel. As
Chair of the Program Committee, I thank the Committee members-Eric R. Claeys, Marie A. Fail-
inger, Joel A. Nichols, and John E. Taylor-for their hard work to bring this panel to fruition. I also
dedicate this Symposium to the memory of Harold J. Berman, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law at
Emory University, who passed away November 12, 2007, in New York City. Without Harold Berman's
pioneering work in law and religion, the AALS Section on Law and Religion may not have existed and
this Symposium may not have occurred. All of us who work in the field of law and religion owe Profes-
sor Berman a great debt both for his extraordinary efforts to establish law and religion as a legitimate
field of inquiry and for his tremendous insights regarding the relationship between law and religion.
We will miss his gracious presence, but his insights will continue to stimulate our thinking for many
years to come.
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headscarves or religious symbols in public schools. Al-
though there are positions between these extremes, religion-
ists and secularists dominate the current debate without
demonstrating much potential for moving the debate
forward.
Perhaps their differences rest on more fundamental dis-
agreements regarding their conceptions of religion, religious
pluralism, and the nature and rule of law. What are these
presuppositions and where do they come from? Are the
presuppositions of religionists and secularists reasonable or
justifiable? Are there other possible positions based on dif-
ferent understandings of religion, religious pluralism, and
the rule of law? How do conceptions of religion, religious
pluralism, and law shape our thinking about the proper role
of religion in a pluralistic democratic society?
The panel description aims to move the debate about the relationship
between law and religion beyond conflicts between secularists and religion-
ists by focusing attention on presuppositions about religion, religious plu-
ralism, and the rule of law. Focusing on these presuppositions helps get
beyond the tendency of most legal scholars, judges, and lawyers to think
through the law rather than about the law. In The Cultural Study of Law:
Reconstructing Legal Scholarship, Paul Kahn refers to the "collapse of the
distinction between the subject studying law and the legal practice that is
the object of study" as "the central weakness of contemporary [legal] schol-
arship."2 Kahn points out that contemporary legal theory is often criticized
as being "too theoretical" and "too disconnected from the practice of law
to be of any interest or use."3 To the contrary, he argues that "[t]heory has
substantially failed to separate itself from practice." Unlike most academic
disciplines, "[t]he legal scholar comes to the study of law already under-
standing herself as a citizen in law's republic" and "committed to 'making
law work,' to improving the legal system of which she is a part."4
This failure to separate legal theory from legal practice, according to
Kahn, is analogous to the study of Christianity as a believer or insider.
Unlike legal scholars, Kahn argues that scholars of religion began sus-
pending belief in the object of study around the beginning of the twentieth
century. Likewise, Kahn maintains that "the scholar of law's rule should
not be asked whether law is the expression of the will of the popular sover-
eign and thus a form of self-government."' He concludes that legal schol-
ars should focus on the meaning of the law for the community of those




5. Id. at 2.
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believing in its validity rather than determining the validity (or resulting
need for reform) of the law itself.'
While some would challenge Kahn's characterization of the ability to
study religion scientifically as an object,7 his argument that law should be
treated as an object of study rather than as a foregone commitment appears
quite strong. When scholars are arguing to reform the law, thinking
through the law can provide some insights even if a fuller account would
include thinking about the law. However, thinking about law's relationship
to other disciplines requires thinking about the law and about the other
discipline in question. In the academic study of religion, scholars utilize
many different disciplinary perspectives and methods to analyze different
aspects of religion. These methods include historical and comparative anal-
ysis, and the perspectives include the anthropology of religion,8 sociology
of religion,9 psychology of religion, 10 history of religions, 1 theology,1 2 and
philosophy of religion.
The articles and essays in this Symposium should greatly aid disclosing
key presuppositions of religionists and secularists by thinking about the law
(rather than through the law) and by employing other disciplinary perspec-
tives and methods to provide a more sophisticated understanding of law
and religion. I will provide a brief summary of each article and essay and
indicate the methods or disciplinary perspectives employed by them in
their analysis.
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. Paul J. Griffiths has argued that religion is "a form of life that seems to those who inhabit it
to be comprehensive, incapable of abandonment, and of central importance." PAUL J. GRIFFITHS,
PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 7 (2001). Given that religion is comprehensive and incapable of
abandonment, Griffiths maintains that attempts to construct a nontheological conception of "'religion'
have almost always (perhaps always; I am not aware of any exceptions) proceeded by way of abstrac-
tion from explicitly theological (and usually Christian-theological and even more usually Protestant-
Christian-theological) such understandings." Paul J. Griffiths, On the Future of the Study of Religion in
the Academy, 74 J. AM. ACAD. REL. 66, 69 (2006). Contrary to those advocating a "scientific" study of
religion like Jonathan Z. Smith, he contends that attempts to escape one's own religious commitments
has failed. Griffiths concludes that "the future of the nontheological academic study of religion" is
"bleak" and that those pursuing the study of religion should make their central religious commitments
clear (e.g., Griffiths identifies his as "Catholic Christian") so that this can be taken into account in their
understanding and analysis of religion. Id. at 74. But cf JONATHAN Z. SMITH, RELATING RELIGION:
ESSAYS IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION 161, 174-75 (2004) (rejecting critiques of classification and compar-
ison in religious studies and advocating the use taxonomy or classification as a "form of scientific detec-
tion known as the academic study of religion"). See also Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions,
Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269, 269 (Mark C. Taylor, ed., 1998) (arguing
that "'religion' is an anthropological not a theological category")
8. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 87-141 (1973).
9. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph
Ward Swain trans., 1915); PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY OF RELIGION (1967).
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN
NATURE (1982) (Martin E. Marty ed.).
11. See, e.g., MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION (Wil-
lard R. Task trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich & World, Inc. 1959).
12. See, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, 1 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1951). See also DAVID TRACY, PLURAL-
ITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 84 (1987).
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While the articles are published in alphabetical order, they can be di-
vided into two subgroups. The first group of articles focuses on analyzing
the key presuppositions of secularists and religionists primarily in the
American context relating to interpretations of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment and President George Washington's religious beliefs.
The articles in this group were written by Scott Idleman, Michael Novak
and Jana Novak, and Steven Smith. The second group of articles focuses
more broadly on how secularist and religionist assumptions impact debates
about constitutionalism, religious pluralism, and paradigms of law and re-
ligion. This group includes articles by Larry Catd Baker, Robin Lovin, and
myself. All of these articles and essays attempt to think about the law
(rather than through the law) and employ other disciplinary perspectives
and methods to provide a more sophisticated understanding of law and
religion.
In his article The Underlying Causes of Divergent First Amendment
Interpretations, Scott Idleman perceptively explains the varying interpreta-
tions of the religion clauses of the First Amendment by identifying "two
subsurface variables that meaningfully influence the reading of history and
historical documents, the discernment of principles, the interpretation of
prior case law, and, ultimately the formulation and application of doc-
trine."13 These variables include "the unconscious associate perception of
religion" and "the perceived relationship between the active presence of
religion and the vitality of the social and political order."' 4 Idleman argues
that these variables become even more important given that the Supreme
Court has not provided an authoritative or comprehensive definition of re-
ligion. 5 Although not persuaded by any of the arguments, Idleman specu-
lates about the possible reasons for this lack of definition including that
religion is impossible to define, that defining religion would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause, or that the definition of religion may be one thing for
the Free Exercise Clause and another thing for the Establishment Clause.' 6
Idleman similarly argues that "one's sense of the relationship between
religion and government necessarily invoves both conscious and uncon-
scious dimensions. '"17 These dimensions include "one's own experiences,"
"one's interpersonal relationships," "one's own foundational belief system
or worldview," and others.' 8 For example, Idleman contends that "[i]f one
begins with a generally positive impression of religion's role in society and
politics, then one would be more likely to accept or favor the interaction of
religion and government and to protect religious conduct from undue legal
13. Scott C. Idleman, The Underlying Causes of Divergent First Amendment Interpretations, 27
Miss. C. L. REv. 65, 66 (2008).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 71-79.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id. at 81-83.
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interference."19 Negative impressions would predictably lead to the oppo-
site result. While not naively optimistic that awareness of these two sub-
surface variables "will modify their influence," Idleman insightfully
maintains that "[i]dentifying these variables is certainly a necessary first
step ...to making the interpretive conflicts of the religion clauses less
perplexing and perhaps, in time, more reconcilable.
20
In their article Washington's God: Religion, Liberty, and the Father of
Our Country, Michael Novak and Jana Novak artfully use historical analy-
sis to challenge the conventional classification of George Washington as a
deist.21 They recognize that there is conflicting evidence regarding whether
Washington was Christian, deist, or of some other religious persuasion.
The Novaks initially note that strong evidence supports that "George
Washington was a leading member of his [Anglican] parish church, serving
as a warden or a vestryman over a period of more than fifteen years. "22
Rather than stop there, they analyze Washington's public prayers and pri-
vate letters and journals to counter the argument that his church involve-
ment was just a matter of show. Michael and Jana Novak conclude that
classifying him as a deist "is flying in the face of a mountain of evidence.
23
On the other hand, this does not mean that "Washington was quite the
explicit and fully orthodox Christian that a few other historians have
claimed to see."'24 Washington clearly embraced a strong sense of divine
providence as he acknowledged in the opening statements of his
Thanksgiving Proclamation of 1789: "Whereas it is the duty of all Nations
to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be
grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor.
25
From Washington's statements, Michael and Jana Novak conclude that "his
concept of God was far more biblical than deist," but that "[h]is official
words seem closer to the One God of the Hebrew Prophets and the psalm-
ist than to the Father, Son, and Paraclete of, say, the fourteenth chapter of
the Gospel of St. John."' 26 Through careful historical analysis including at-
tention to the theological ideas prominent during Washington's life,
Michael and Jana Novak greatly increase our theological understanding of
President Washington-the father of our country.
Steven D. Smith's article How Is America "Divided by God"? in-
sightfully undercovers "the fundamental underlying differences in presup-
positions that surface in more concrete [American church-state]
19. Id. at 83.
20. Id. at 87.
21. Michael Novak and Jana Novak, Washington's God: Religion, Liberty, and the Father of Our
Country, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 103 (2008).
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 136.
24. Id. at 136.
25. Id. at 126.
26. Id. at 137.
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controversies over crosses and curriculum and the like.",2 7 Rather than ac-
cept at face value the frequently offered statistic that about 90 percent of
Americans say they "believe in God," he breaks down this group based on
different understandings of the nature of God (e.g., personal or imper-
sonal) and the "existential urgency" with which they believe in God (e.g.,
tame or strong). His analysis divides subjects roughly into two camps-
secularists and strong religionists. Strong religionists "include all of those
(whether or not of fundamentalist convictions) who not only believe in
God, but who believe in an active, engaged, sort of deity, and for whom this
belief is important and plays a large role in their cognitive and active
life."'28 However, Smith clarifies that secularists include atheists and agnos-
tics, "tame religionists," and some "strong religionists."
Smith then persuasively uses this more nuanced understanding of
these categories to explain contemporary positions on Establishment
Clause issues. For example, he maintains that an overlapping consensus
among atheists and agnostics, "tame religionists," and some strong religion-
ists explains the widespread acceptance of the constitutional doctrine re-
quiring that government action have "a 'secular' purpose and a primarily
'secular' effect. ' ' 29 He explains that "secular" means different things for
each constituency. Atheists and agnostics favor secularity for obvious rea-
sons. Alternatively, tame religionists embrace secularity because they view
god as detached and "irrelevant to practical concerns (and therefore of no
relevance to the practical concerns of politics and government)" or "be-
lieve in a biblical God but feel no real urgency or existential commit-
ment."3 ° Finally, the strong religionists who support secularity include
those who favor a secular sphere on religious grounds like the "Roger Wil-
liams-type strong believers whose 'two kingdoms' conception is one of
marked discontinuity between realms."'" Although somewhat ambivalent
about whether clearer understanding about underlying presuppositions will
foster greater respect among secularists and strong religionists, Smith
rightly concludes that "our best bet is to cultivate a respectful though not
dishonest or intellectually soft toleration among fundamentally different
worldviews.,
3 2
Larry Cati Baker's article entitled God(s) Over Constitutions: Interna-
tional and Religious Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century
33
utilizes a comparative method of analysis. He keenly discerns the implica-
tions of the rise of theocratic transnational constitutionalism in Iran, Iraq,
27. Steven D. Smith, How Is America "Divided by God"?, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 139 (2008).
28. Id. at 145.
29. Id. at 147.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 148.
32. Id. at 154.
33. Larry CatA Baker, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational Con-
stitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 11 (2008).
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and Afghanistan for the post-World War II secular transnational constitu-
tionalism embraced by most constitutional governments and for the na-
tional constitutionalism embraced by China and the United States (i.e., the
rejection of international legal norms as limitations on state power).
Backer argues that "[a]t the end of the 20th century, members of the elite
global constitutional law academic community" assumed that "a world or-
der in which the idea of a sigle transcendent system of supra-national, that
is of transnational, constitutionalism" constituted "the great norm of all
legitimate national constitutionalism."34
Contrary to these assumptions, Backer contends that the rise of theo-
cratic transnational constitutionalism in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan signals
an under-appreciated contest between theocratic and secular constitution-
alism regarding which universal substantive values-religious or secular-
should limit provisions of national constitutions. Backer maintains that this
competition may have several important consequences such as redefining
"the scope of protection of religious minorities" and providing "a basis for
rethinking the substantive basis of old constitutional orders."35 With re-
spect to the later, Backer points out the irony that the United States, which
was instrumental in facilitating the theocratic transnational constitutional-
ism in Afghanistan and Iraq, may see the transplantation of theocratic
transnational constitutionalism back to the United States given the calls to
''recover its roots as a religious state with a plural but common grounding
in Christianity."36 Moreover, Backer's article contributes to a more sophis-
ticated understanding of the relationship between law and religion by going
beyond the assumed normativity of secular transnational or national consti-
tutionalism and recognizing the importance of religion for understanding
the recent rise of theocratic transnational constitutionalism.
In his article Religion and Religious Pluralism, Robin Lovin astutely
identifies the Protestant theological roots of normative religious pluralism
that have been generally overlooked in political and legal theory.37 Lovin
argues that to understand the "normative religious pluralism" that charac-
terizes American religious life requires "moving beyond the distinctively
American experience of religious pluralism to a more general political plu-
ralism that develops alongside the emergence of the modern state itself."38
In particular, he maintains that in the West, the "rethinking of politics
originated in the Protestant Reformation, so that the necessary political
arrangements for the emergence of normative religious pluralism were
themselves grounded in religious thought about political life."39 As a be-
ginning to this rethinking of politics, Lovin emphasizes Luther's important
recognition of "sovereign secular authority" as a separate sphere ordained
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 61-62.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 89 (2008).
38. Id. at 101.
39. Id.
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by God with its own authority to promote security and order.4" Lovin then
notes that Protestant, Catholic, and Anglican thought all eventually devel-
oped different theologies of political pluralism that recognized the "sover-
eignty" of separate social spheres relating to religion, government, family,
work, and culture.41 The influential political philosophy of John Locke
similarly recognized a separate realm of authority for religion and em-
braced political pluralism.42
The political pluralism supported by these theological and philosophi-
cal arguments created space where religious pluralism could flourish. Nor-
mative religious pluralism does not just recognize the fact of religious
pluralism. "In normative religious pluralism, religious diversity is en-
couraged and protected by social practices and sometimes by law."43 Lovin
further emphasizes "[t]hat religious pluralism grew in the space provided
by this civic neutrality was thus a consequence of religious commitment to
political pluralism that began in the exigencies of Reformation conflict, but
became a necessary feature of modern life over a couple of centuries of
political experience.' 44 Lovin concludes that "[r]eligious pluralism be-
comes normative ... where religion is supported by political pluralism or
finds its own religious reasons to advocate political pluralism."45 Thus,
contrary to conventional wisdom about law and religion, Lovin's historical
analysis identifies the theological justification for normative religious plu-
ralism in the West and inverts the common assumption that secular politi-
cal authority was pragmatically justified as a way to get beyond religious
warfare and the inadequacies of religion.
Finally, my article Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part I): Toward
a New Paradigm for Law and Religion attempts to isolate paradigms of law
and religion to reveal the "key assumptions about law, religion, and their
relationship that are rarely examined because they are reflexively taken for
granted."46 I argue that "[t]he secularization of the law represents the most
widely-held but least examined assumption of the modern paradigm of law
and religion."47 To motivate some critical distance from this assumption, I
analyze the origin of the modern paradigm as a reaction to the religious
pluralism and wars of religion following the Protestant Reformation in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I also provide a definition of religion
and religious pluralism and summarize the conventional assumptions about
the secularization of the law.
Despite the widespread acceptance of the modern paradigm, I argue
that legal indeterminacy and the ontological gap between legal theory and
40. Id. at 94.
41. Id. at 97-100.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. at 102.
46. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part 1): Toward a New Paradigm




legal practice present crises for the modern paradigm. Legal indeterminacy
means that strong legal formalism does not maintain the autonomy of law
as Max Weber assumed it would. Rather, the secularization of law must
now be achieved by a normative theory of law. The main types of liberal
and republican normative theories of law under the modern paradigm-
represented by John Rawls, Jirgen Habermas, and French secularism-
fail, however, "for several of the following reasons: 1) they denied legal
indeterminacy; 2) they were incoherent; or 3) they required establishing a
comprehensive secularism in violation of the Establishment Clause and a
proper understanding of religious pluralism."48 In the Part II of this article,
I will attempt to set forth a new constructive postmodern paradigm which
maintains that "the text of the law must be explicitly secularized (i.e., no
explicit recognition of religion), but at the same time, the law is implicitly
legitimated by a plurality of religious foundations. The constructive
postmodern paradigm of law and religion thus leads to the desecularization
of the law."49
All of the articles and essays in this Symposium provide rich insights
into presuppositions about law and religion that have not been sufficiently
examined in prior debates. Each of these articles and essays attempt to
think about the law (rather than through the law) and employ other disci-
plinary perspectives and methods to provide a more sophisticated under-
standing of law's relationship to religion. Our hope is that they advance
the conversation about law and religion in ways that provide for new ave-
nues of reflection.
48. Id. at 202.
49. Id. at 162.
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